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The discussion paper is an analysis into the effects of integration of Central East European 
(CEE) economies into the World market in general and the economic region of the European 
Union (EU) in particular. 
Despite acknowledging that there is no alternative to integration  for CEE economies as a 
condition sine qua non for  catch-up development for transition economies, the paper 
embraces the possibility of integration itself  resulting in the peripheralisation of the weaker 
integration partner against the core of the E U.  By assessing the structural  impact of  the 
integration process up until now on the development of the productivity gap between individual 
transition economies and the average of the EU, the paper aims at determining which transition 
economy can be expected to benefit from further integration into the international division of 
labour, and for which some (structural) political support can enhance the conditions for the 
closure of the productivity gap. 
Following a theoretical review of integration theories, the paper analyses structural change at 
branch-levels for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in four classes of comparable 
technological sophistication and concludes that solely Hungary’s development since 1992 
indicates sufficient  potentials for further productivity increases  to expect the economy to 
benefit from further integration. In the cases of the Czech Republic and Poland, the analysis 
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5 
Introduction 
Not least since the Copenhagen summit in June 1993 first officially invited the Visegrád-
four to submit their applications for European Union membership to thereby engage into a 
new round of an eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU), the economic 
profession engaged in extensive research into the effects of integration for both partners. 
Dominated by the orthodox conceptualisation of economic integration as a matter of 
economic welfare, most research dealt with the potentials for efficiency gains and the 
intensification of foreign trade, concluding that integration would be advantageous for all 
partners. In particular, most economists from Central East Europe treat an early EU 
membership as a preferential condition of economic development in their region. A 
scenario in which an unprotected, early integration of transformation economies might 
result in a divergence of levels of economic development between the EU and its new 
members, i.e. their peripheralisation, never advanced to the forefront of the agenda of EU 
membership for CEECs. Few theory-guided research has so far been published on the 
possible dangers of an early or premature integration, overburdening the current state of 
competitiveness of the transformation economies in Central East Europe. Yet, the obvious 
experience which can b e drawn  not least  from the East German case of a shock-
integration of a transformation economy highlights that such a scenario of premature 
integration has to be taken seriously: the possibility of a European ‘Mezzogiorno’ in the 
East is just as relevant as the widely-acknowledged possibility of a German ‘Mezzo-
giorno’1 in the East.2 
Having just concluded an era of autarky from the western world, there however cannot be 
an alternative in the long term for CEECs to integration into the world economy in general 
and the EU in particular. They do have, however, an alternative over the speed and 
structural components of further steps of integration, namely the point of time of fixing 
exchange rates within ERM (and eventually EMU), as well as further liberalisation and 
deregulation  of markets (leading to intensifying competition with respect to the flow of 
goods and factors) and the intervention of the state in favour of  competitiveness of 
domestic producers (industrial policy). Premature integration would describe a scenario in 
                                                 
1  Refer to e.g. Hall and Ludwig (1993), Hallett and Ma (1993), Kammerer (1991), Kaser (1998a and 
1998b), Nolte and Sitte (1995). 
2  In particular, the malaise of the East German example of catch-up development cannot be attributed 
exclusively to the revaluation of the GDR-mark vis-à-vis the German Mark of the Federal Republic: 
whilst a normal revaluation changes the relation between external prices and domestic costs only, 
the German monetary union altered all prices and costs simultaneously and to a comparable extent 
(Stephan 1999). IWH ________________________________________________________________ 
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which the economy is not granted sufficient time to fit itself for the complete overhaul of 
virtually all conditions determining the processes of production, investment and 
consumption, that is not least to fit itself for intensified competition, be it to accommodate 
catch-up in terms of productivity or a gradualisation of the necessary structural adjustment. 
The paper is organised as follows. An excursus into the theory of economic integration 
with particular reference to the peculiarities CEECs is necessary to debunk some of the 
over-optimistic assumptions with respect to the integration of CEECs into the EU. A 
critical analysis of integration theories and their application on the cases of CEECs 
highlights the paramount importance to be attached to the respective levels of productivity 
between the CEECs and the EU, as well as their development. In particular, this part leads 
to the underlying hypothesis of the paper: a sufficiently low and narrowing gap between the 
respective productivity levels of integration partners is a condition  sine-qua-non for 
integration to be development enhancing, i.e. to allow per capita incomes to converge. 
This is essentially a structural argument (evolving international division of labour) and is 
concerned with the size of potentials for further productivity increases as determined by the 
pattern of branch specialisation of domestic production (quite independently of 
technology-import and diffusion). Because it is beyond the scope of the paper to actually 
be able to quantify the minimum level of the productivity gap that is necessary to postulate 
that integration will be development enhancing, the focus will be on whether integration so 
far has already led to a partial closure of the gap or rather not. In the case of stagnation 
despite the quite significant extent of integration and time that passed until today, the paper 
assumes that further integration cannot be expected to improve the conditions for catch-up 
development. 
Part 2 provides an empirical picture of the actual size and development of the productivity 
gap between some CEECs and the average of 15 EU economies. Part 3 serves to explain 
the reasons for a focus on endogenous sources for productivity increases in this paper. The 
empirical analysis in part 4 finally assesses past technological structural change in CEECs 
and attempts to interpret the results in terms of potentials for future productivity increases, 
hence the chances that further integration into the EU will yield favourable results, 
convergence in per capita income levels. 
1  Excursus into Integration Theory with Reference to the 
Peculiarities of CEECs 
When concerned with the topic of economic integration and its effects on all integration 
partners, the economic profession predominantly concentrates on basically three main ________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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strands of integration theories: one is Ricardo’s notion of ‘comparative advantages’. It 
focuses on productivity differentials both between different products in one economy and 
between the domestic economy and the world market. It grants economies that suffer from 
relatively higher production costs (‘absolute’ disadvantages) a ‘competitive’ advantage for 
some products (beginning with the highest productivity products) by way of a downward 
adjustment of a foreign trade-determined exchange rate (which governs the process of 
specialisation by balancing the aggregate values of exports and imports): the exchange rate 
of the economy dominated by absolute disadvantages will devalue to transform absolute 
disadvantages of some products into competitive advantages. ‘Comparative’ advantage 
involves a double comparison: one of relative prices, i.e. between goods in one economy, 
and second between the domestic price and the one on the world market for each good. 
Integration serves to deepen specialisation, and welfare benefits for all integration partners 
lie with the benefits of specialisation. The application of Ricardo’s concept of comparative 
advantages on the case of CEECs is however riddled with the problem that it crucially 
depends on the assumption of a ‘neutral’ exchange rate which adapts to the changing 
pattern of international trade. CEECs typically use  exchange rate policy to  support 
  monetary stabilisation, exchange rates therefore tend to be overvalued, incapable 
of balancing aggregate values of imports and exports. Furthermore, the exchange rate is 
not solely governed by foreign trade of goods and services, but also by cross-country 
capital movements. CEECs typically experience capital import surpluses (portfolio and 
foreign direct investment) effecting higher exchange rates than required to balance imports 
and exports. Current account deficits are the result and recurrent foreign trade deficits 
increase foreign indebtedness. 
What we can infer from the concept of ‘comparative advantages’ is that integration will 
increase welfare in all integrating partners compared to a scenario of autarky, but only if 
exchange rates are sufficiently downwards adjustable as called for by Ricardo’s concept. 
The concept, moreover does not extend from this comparative-static analysis. It remains 
open, what effects the pattern of specialisation is likely to have in a more dynamic view. 
This is the focus of the Heckscher/Ohlin theory. It assumes that specialisation through 
foreign trade is governed by relative factor endowments, as each economy specialises on 
the production that uses more intensively abundant production factors. Usually, this 
concept is used to allot CEECs the labour-intensive, low wage fraction of production in 
the international division o f labour of an enlarged European economy. The 
Samuelson/Stolper-argument, i.e. the contention that such specialisation will lead to 
converging factor prices (thereby constituting economic convergence via integration) is a 
result of the assumption that the capital-intensive economy suffers from higher production IWH ________________________________________________________________ 
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costs of labour-intensive products, because wages per interest rates are higher compared 
to the relative wage-interest costs in the labour-intensive economy. Following foreign trade 
and specialisation, the price for labour-intensive products will converge upwards in the 
labour-intensive economy and downwards in the capital-intensive economy. Given equal 
productivities, wages will equalise. If productivities differ, however, and more specifically, 
as soon as the price disadvantage of the capital-intensive economy for the labour-intensive 
product disappears, the factor price equalisation-case does not hold any more 
A further problem with this concept is rather a ‘strategic’ one: an economy that specialises 
on labour-intensive production may find itself trapped in an unfavourable position of 
international division of labour, in which only little potentials for productivity increases exist. 
Productivity levels therefore can be expected to diverge, and the factor price-equalisation 
mechanism will at some point fail. A model backing this case, can be found in Snower’s 
concept of a ‘low skill, bad job-trap’ (1994). It shows that an economy, specialising in 
low-wage production may find it increasingly difficult to upgrade the quality of jobs it is 
generating and hence may prove unable to further close the productivity gap vis-à-vis 
higher developed economies. A formal analysis is provided to describe the possible 
scenario of a vicious circle of low productivity, deficient training, and inefficient skilled 
jobs. Assuming, as suggested by Snower, that ‘low skill jobs’ go hand in hand with low 
remuneration (i.e. wages, earnings  and profits), his theoretical concept can already 
consistently explain the inability of an economy to catch up in terms of per capita income, 
when specialising according to the criterion of relative factor scarcities. 
It is mainly to the credit of the ‘New Trade Theories’ and ‘New Growth Theories’ that the 
possibility of detrimental effects of  economic integration have entered the theoretical 
agenda. The strength of these theories lies in their ability to explain what determines 
convergence or divergence of levels of economic development as consequences of the 
process of integration. Favourability of integration stems primarily from specialisation of 
economic regions on particular groups of economic activity, giving rise to internal and 
external scale economies, agglomeration advantages, optimisation of transport costs, as 
well as acceleration on the learning curve. To reap significant scale economies, 
specialisation has to be deep. Eventually, foreign trade between equal partners (the 
criterion being similar levels of productivities) involves the shift from inter-industrial trade 
between vertically integrated own-producers (as predominant in transition economies) to 
intra-industrial trade between horizontally interacting producers. Typically, however, intra-
industrial trade tends to deepen existing strengths and regional concentration. 
Agglomeration advantages in firm-clusters can serve as ‘head-start’ in competition against 
emerging competitors (either newly set up firms or firms new to the regional market due to ________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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integration). Conditional to the decision on (re-)location is the already existing level of 
development (quality of labour force, level of productivity, infrastructure, etc.) and a 
sufficiently large home market. The process of restructuring following integration therefore 
is to some extent governed by “a strong arbitrary accidental component to international 
specialisation” (Krugman 1991, p. 9), i.e. by what he termed the ‘historical accident’. 
Until today, the economic profession remains rather hesitant in considering the possible 
effects described by these theoretical concepts when assessing expectable effects of future 
integration in general and the integration project of CEECs in particular (for exceptions, 
see e.g. Gabrisch/Werner 1998, Riese 1996, Tichy 1997). This despite the fact that in 
reality, integration projects not always led to convergence but often enough also clear 
divergence.3 The conclusions to be drawn from these concepts is that integration does not 
by itself constitute a sufficient condition for the equalisation of factor prices and 
convergence of per capital income levels, hence levels of economic development. 
Clearly, the historical conditions work to the detriment of CEECs against the EU (refer to 
Tichy 1997 for a comprehensive analysis). Whilst they would probably command a 
sufficiently large market when embracing intensified integration amongst themselves 
(concept of a ‘double-fold integration’: Hölscher/Stephan 1997 and Dangerfield 1999), 
large differences in the quality of produce and productivity hamper the deepening of intra-
industrial trade.4 Hence, further steps of integration of CEECs into the EU at the current 
state of affairs might well be to the detriment of development prospects in CEECs. Positive 
effects of further integration hinge first on the extent of future productivity increases (closing 
the gap between the levels in the EU and the ones in CEECs), and additionally on a 
sufficiently low exchange rate to grant CEECs a competitive edge for their enterprises to 
sustain intensifying competition. 
What we can learn from the above assessment are basically two insights: first, theories of 
integration do not necessarily predict welfare gains for all integration partners. Rather, an 
alteration of a few assumptions to more realistic conditions can yield the opposite effect of 
integration. Integration, therefore, is not per se a guarantee for economic convergence, but 
also contains the danger to actually effect economic peripheralisation. Further extensions 
and/or specifications to match conditions in the economies involved in the integration 
                                                 
3  Whilst Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1991) make their case that, in the aggregate of all integration projects, 
integration itself has yielded a convergence coefficient (ß) of some 2 per cent, their analysis of 
poorer regions in the EU proves on the contrary that divergence has grown. 
4  Research trying to identify the extent and development of intra-industrial trade between CEECs and 
the EU come to the conclusion that until today, trade between CEECs and the EU exhibit strong 
signs of persistent inter-industrial trade (Gabrisch/Werner 1998). IWH ________________________________________________________________ 
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process are therefore n ecessary to generate more realistic information on expectable 
effects of integration. Second, the criterion of a sufficiently low productivity gap determines 
to a significant extent the favourability of integration where catch-up in terms of economic 
development rather than peripheralisation is the eventual goal. 
With respect to the integration project of CEECs, these theoretical assessments allow us 
to assume that the extreme of premature integration of transformation economies might 
result in the smaller and weaker partners being peripheralised against the EU. Favourability 
for individual transition economies depends primarily on the actual size and development of 
the productivity gap. 
2  The Size and the Development of the Productivity Gap 
This paper focuses on the sufficiently robust stylised fact derived not least from the 
German experience, namely that the productivity gap5 appears to be a persistent 
phenomenon in the special case of transformation economies. At least in the German case, 
the persistency of this gap may prevent economic catch-up in terms of income per capita: 
within a monetary union, competitiveness predominantly depends on the level of efficiency 
in production (hence productivity), as prices and costs can be expected to converge. 
Aggregate national income in the region disadvantaged by the lower level of productivity 
will have to correspond to the productivity gap. For as long as the economies in East 
Central Europe use their exchange rate pegs in favour of monetary stabilisation, the 
mechanism from the monetary union case holds here as well: aggregate national income per 
capita, the usual measure for the level of economic development, and hence the target for 
catch-up development, can only rise at the same speed as productivity increases. The 
closure of the productivity gap advances to a condition  sine qua non of catch-up 
development. 
Chart 1 provides an overview of the respective sizes of productivity gaps of six selected 
economies in Central East Europe against the average productivity level in the 15 EU 
economies. For reasons of comparability, the respective levels of productivity were 
converted into the common currency of ECU at average annual market exchange rates 
                                                 
5  The properties of this gap have been analysed at length by the Institute for Economic Research 
Halle (IWH). The results can be found in numerous recent articles in “Wirtschaft im Wandel”. In 
general, the gap is estimated to have narrowed from some 65 to 70 per cent down to slightly less 
than 40 per cent within only a few years but stagnated henceforth. ________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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(due to the under or overvaluation of CEEC-currencies, some distortion of results are 
possible). 



















EU 15 = 100
1991-1998
 
Note:  Productivity approximated by GDP per total employment.  
Source:  Eurostat, Europäische Wirtschaft No. 65, WIIW Database, own calculations. 
All economies show clear signs of increasing average productivity levels, relative to the 
simultaneous increase in the EU economies, i.e. definitely a closing of the gap. The levels, 
however, remain significantly far apart and no intra-CEEC convergence can be observed 
so far: Slovenia and Hungary exhibit the highest levels, reaching 47 and 34 per cent 
respectively of the average EU level in end 1998. The Czech and Slovak Republics and 
Poland show very similar levels and trends. Their gaps are significantly higher, some 20 per 
cent of the EU average. Estonia, showing the biggest productivity gap, started from an 
extremely low level in 1992, was able to increase its average labour productivity at the 
highest rates within this sample and today compares with the second group comprised of 
the Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland. This picture clearly shows that significant 
further productivity-increases are necessary to achieve levels comparable to the average of 
economies in the EU. With respect to integration theories, this supports the case that the 
particularity of a sizeable productivity gap definitely needs to be addressed in the set of 
assumptions. 
3  The Focus on Endogenous Productivity Increases 
What appears to command paramount importance with respect to the determination of 
effects of further integration, lies with the size and development of the productivity gap. 
Several factors determine the development of the average productivity level: first, the IWH ________________________________________________________________ 
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productivity gap in CEECs can be held to be a result of the less advanced transition 
economies using inferior technology in across-the-board production. Hence, the transfer of 
technology from East to West through foreign direct investment and the imitation of high-
tech produce from the West can improve productivity levels. It remains however uncertain, 
whether the productive entities in the CEECs are actually able to absorb such foreign and 
as yet unknown, hence unincorporated technology (absorptive capacity) and whether the 
installation of such will produce sufficient externalities to allow other producers to benefit 
(diffusion). 
The second factor stretches beyond such across-the-board improvements of production 
or product technology but is rather concerned with increases in average productivity-levels 
through structural change: i ntensifying integration will trigger structural adjustment 
processes, thereby assigning CEECs a particular position within the international division of 
labour relative to the EU. The evolving pattern influences the potentials for future 
productivity increases: a specialisation of CEECs on branches with relatively lower 
technological sophistication can be associated with lower potentials for productivity 
increases and vice versa. 
An association of productivity growth and structural change can be found in the theoretic 
literature in the context of ‘logistic growth path’ models (e.g. Cornwall and Cornwall, 
1994). Usually aimed at the long term, these models describe a typical connection 
between the productivity level and the pattern of structural specialisation. Applied to short 
term structural change, this concept is able to describe how structural change in the 
integration process entails endogenous productivity increases, a task ventured by the most 
recent literature of New Growth Theory (e.g. Grosman and Helpman). 
The transformation economies in Central East Europe still enjoy considerable potentials for 
structural change, as their own era of autarky gave rise to and cemented a specific 
structure of production and specialisation. Whilst such heritage today b urdens the 
economies in Central East Europe, the newly emerging patterns, following the dissolution 
of the old ones, entail the chance to embrace structural change as an engine for 
endogenous productivity increases (Schumpeter’s concept of ‘creative destruction’). 
The aim of the empirical part 4 of this paper is to assess the relative potentials of future 
productivity increases between the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as determined by 
the emerging pattern on branch-specialisation.6 Assuming that R&D in enterprises increase 
                                                 
6  So far, empirical data could only be used from these economies and for the periods of 1991 to 1998 
(1992 to 1998 in the case of Hungary). Further research extending the selection of transition 
economies, the period of analysis as well as further disaggregation of branches will follow in the 
near future. ________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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the potentials of productivity growth via product and process innovation, then branch-
specific levels of ‘technological sophistication’ (measured in R&D-intensities) can provide 
the necessary criterion for the relative sizes of potentials of productivity growth of the 
respective branches. Hence, by looking at the respective patterns of specialisation 
emerging today, as well as past R&D expenditure at branch levels, this method can inform 
about the relative size of potentials of individual CEECs to close the productivity gap via 
‘technological structural change’. 
This rather innovative approach could not only provide policy makers with the necessary 
information to conduct integration and development-consistent economic policies, but also 
helps to determine whether a specific economy can be trusted to benefit from further 
integration by assessing past achievements in such structural change in relation to the 
current state of affairs. 
4  R&D-Intensities and the Pattern of Technological Structural 
Change 
As criterion of branch-classification for the analysis of technological structural change, the 
analysis applies the measure of R&D-intensities. R&D-intensities are calculated according 
to the method  suggested  by the OECD (1992, p. 125) and concern exclusively the 
manufacturing sector of the economy, as here the nexus between structural change, R&D-
driven technology, and productivity growth or potentials thereof can be assumed to be 
most direct.  
In following the contention of the OECD that industry-specific R&D-intensities in the West 
exhibited significant instabilities, i.e. that industry-branches frequently switched between the 
classes of high technology, medium technology and low technology, four rather than three 
categories were considered in order to provide branches at the margins between classes 
with an own classification. The table in the annex provides a list of ISIC two-digit branches 
in the three selected economies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland together with 
their individual R&D-intensities and their subsequent classification. 
Technological structural change can then be identified as shifts of relative weights of these 
classes in total production, in other words: a pattern of specialisation in the manufacturing 
industry towards higher or lower technology branches. According to the theoretical 
reflections outlined above, the assumption is that a growing share of the high technology 
and medium-high technology classes (at the expense of the medium-low technology and 
low technology classes) - as positive technological structural change - inherently increases IWH ________________________________________________________________ 
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the potentials for future productivity increases, hence potentials for catch-up in terms of 
income per capita. 
Chart 2  Technological Structural Change in the Czech Republic, Hungary 





































High tech Medium high tech Medium low tech Low tech
Poland: 1991-1998
 
Source:  OECD (1997) and National Statistical Offices, own calculations. 
Chart 2 depicts the development of relative shares of classes between the years of 1991 
(for Hungary: 1992) up until 1998. Undoubtedly, the Czech Republic accumulates the 
highest shares in the two classes of high and medium high technology combined. On a 
more dynamic view, however, not much structural change over the period of time ________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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observed can be diagnosed; there has been some mild shift in shares from branches of 
medium low to branches of medium high technological sophistication: the sum of the shares 
of the two branches of higher technological sophistication increased by a mere 3.8 
percentage points. Despite the opening of the economy to foreign competition and despite 
the Czech Republic having undergone the typical ‘transformational recession’ and 
subsequently strong economic growth, structural adjustment in manufacturing has been 
comparatively remote. More or less the same is true for Poland, albeit involving slightly 
more dynamics. While the medium low class contracted by 8.1 points (3.8 points in the 
case of the Czech Republic), the medium high class expanded by 4.9 percentage points 
(Czech Republic: 3.2 ). Some of this contraction in the Polish case, however, did not 
occur to the advantage of a class in higher technological ranking, but rather benefited the 
low technology class: while in the Czech Republic, technological structural change involved 
a specialisation away from medium low tech branches towards medium high ones, it is the 
medium high as well as low tech classes that gained in Poland - an ambiguous picture. In 
general, however, the structure of Poland’s manufacturing industry features a clear 
dominance for branches of lower technological sophistication, the combined shares of the 
two lower technology classes amounts to approximately two thirds. 
Quite to the contrary, however, Hungary exhibits strong positive technological structural 
change between 1992 and 1998: starting off in 1992 with a clear bias for the two classes 
of lower technological sophistication, this picture  had  reversed by 1998, when the 
combined shares of the two higher classes reached 52 per cent of the total of 
manufacturing industrial sales (an increase of 14.5 percentage points). Hungary’s 
technological structural change in the manufacturing industry essentially involved a 
specialisation away from branches of low technological sophistication towards such of 
medium high technological sophistication. The latter class increased its share by 16.5 
percentage points, while the low tech class contracted by 12.6 points. The two classes of 
high and medium low technology merely stagnated. 
The development of branch shares in total manufacturing sales within the individual 
technology classes discloses what branches have been causal to the decline or rise of 
shares in different classes (see the table on the following page). The relative decline of the 
medium low technology class in the Czech Republic, the most obvious technological 
structural change in that economy, can mainly be attributed to coke, refined petroleum and 
nuclear fuels (ISIC 23), which lost 2.6 percentage points in shares between 1991 and 
1998. Growth in the medium high class was driven mainly by basic metals (ISIC 27) and 
fabricated metal products (ISIC 28), together gaining 1.6 points.7 Rubber and plastic 
                                                 
7  Interestingly, the classification of the OECD for the average of all OECD economies allocates both 
ISIC 27 and 28 to the low technology class. In the Czech case, the higher classification is due to IWH ________________________________________________________________ 
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products (ISIC 25), allocated in Czech’s high technology class, grew by 2.1 points, this 
was alleviated though by a reduced share of machinery manufacturing (ISIC 29), which fell 
by 2.4 points. 
In the case of Poland, the declining share of the medium low class was effected by coke, 
refined petroleum and nuclear fuels (2.8 points), as was the case in the Czech Republic, as 
well as basic metals, which fell by 2.3 points. The increase in the share of the medium high 
technology class can be attributed mostly to the manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers 
(ISIC 34), increasing by 4 percentage points. No significant increase or decline can be 
observed in the individual branches of the Polish high technology class. 
Table  Branches Gaining and Losing from Structural Specialisation 
    Specialisation gainers  Specialisation losers   
Czech Republic +   2.1 
+   1.6 
Rubber and plastic products 
Basic metals, fabricated metal 
product 






Hungary  + 11.4  Motor vehicles and trailers  Food products and beverages  - 9.7 
  +   7.2 
 
+   4.4 
Office, accounting and 
computing machinery 
Radio, TV and communication 
Chemicals and chemical products 





Poland  +   4.0 
+   1.6 
Motor vehicles and trailers 
Publishing and printing 




  +   1.5  Rubber and plastic products  Basic metals  - 2.3 
Note:  figures are percentage points change of relative shares in total manufacturing sales. 
In Hungary, structural change not only involves a clear specialisation towards branches of 
higher technological sophistication, but is also more dynamic than in Poland or the Czech 
Republic: the marked decline in shares of the low technology class in Hungary can be 
attributed nearly exclusively to the relative decline in the manufacture of food products and 
beverages (ISIC 15), which lost 9.7 percentage points. The immense increase in shares of 
the medium high technology class is due to motor vehicles (11.4 percentage points), as 
was the case in Poland, as well as office, accounting and computing machinery (ISIC 30), 
which grew by 7.2 points. Within the same class, however, the share of coke, refined 
petroleum and nuclear fuels fell by 5 percentage points. Were this branch to be counted as 
a medium low technology industry (in the Czech Republic and Poland as well as in the 
OECD, this branch  belongs to the medium low technology class), the positive 
technological structural change in Hungary would be more obvious still. Within the high 
                                                                                                                                         
higher initial R&D expenditure, probably reflecting the necessary technological upgrading of the 
old industrial capacities. I n general,  there are some marked differences in some classifications 
between OECD and CEE economies as there are differences between CEE economies. ________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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technology class, the radio, TV and communication equipment industry (ISIC 32) 
increased its share by 4.4 percentage points. At the same time, however, the 6.6 points 
decline of the share of chemical industry  (ISIC 24) effected the modest decline of the 
aggregate share of the high technology class. 
The results  of this analysis indicate marked differences between the three economies. 
Hungary’s  pattern of  technological  structural change involves a  clear and strong 
specialisation towards branches of medium high technological sophistication at the expense 
of branches of low technological sophistication. According to the assumptions made in the 
paper, this would indicate that Hungary can expect to bear significant potentials for future 
productivity increases:  while  branches  that  grew  with the highest rates  have  also 
experienced high R&D expenditure in relation to sales, it is branches with only little R&D 
effort in relation to sales which grew the least or contracted most. Short term potentials for 
productivity increases can therefore be expected to be sizeable.  In particular,  all 
specialisation gainers can be considered branches of medium high and high technological 
sophistication  also  in OECD economies.  Assuming that the Hungarian technology-
classification will in the medium to long term converge to today’s OECD classification (as 
industries develop, they will exhibit typical intrinsic R&D intensities which depend solely on 
the industry rather than the economy they are situated in), then medium to long term 
prospects for productivity increases are good as well.  Economic transformation and 
integration of the Hungarian economy up until now effected this clear pattern of structural 
change that can unambiguously be considered a favourable pattern of specialisation in 
international division of  labour. If  further integration deepens that specialisation pattern, 
then the prospects for a productivity catch-up are good. 
This clear picture cannot be inferred from the analysis of the Czech Republic. Here, the 
pattern of specialisation is not as clear as in the Hungarian case and less pronounced. 
Moreover, the branches which gained most in the course of structural change would be 
considered  medium  low  and low technological  industries in OECD economies. Given, 
however, that branches of higher technological sophistication combine the highest shares in 
manufacturing production in the Czech Republic as compared to Hungary or Poland, the 
prospects for future productivity increases  in the short term  are not too bleak. With 
intensifying integration, longer tem potentials for productivity catch-up through structural 
change, however, are rather low. It could be held that further integration without some 
structural p olicy could  allocate the manufacturing industry of the Czech Republic an 
unfavourable position in the international division of labour which could prevent economic 
catching  up. Structural policy could favour for example branches like office, accounting 
and computing machinery (ISIC 30), electrical machinery and apparatus (ISIC 31), radio, IWH ________________________________________________________________ 
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TV and communication equipment (ISIC 32), medical, precision and opticals, watches 
and clocks (ISIC 33) as well as the chemical industry (ISIC 24), as these branches are 
already of relevant size and enough R&D effort had gone into these branches to support a 
classification as medium high tech industries. With respect to the longer term prospects, 
these branches would also be considered high and medium high tech industries according 
to the OECD experience. These branches have experienced only modest growth until 
today albeit growing shares in total manufacturing, and are therefore specialisation gainers. 
The picture for Poland is different from the ones for Hungary and the Czech Republic yet: 
accumulating the lowest share  of  branches of  higher technological  sophistication  in 
manufacturing  amongst the panel analysed in this paper, technological structural change 
does in fact exhibit a clear trend favouring medium high tech industries at the expense of 
medium low tech ones. However, also the share of low tech industries clearly grew. Just as 
ambiguous is the picture inferred from  the table:  the classification according to OECD 
experience  of  specialisation gainers  in  Poland  ranges from medium high to low tech 
industries, the ones for Polish specialisation losers, however, would also be considered 
medium low and low tech industries in OECD economies. For Poland, the analysis would 
therefore  suggest that long term  prospects  of future productivity catch-up through 
structural  adjustment  are  quite positive, while short term potentials  for productivity 
increases due to today’s specialisation pattern are rather low. Here again, there is a case 
for structural policy accommodating  positive structural effects of further integration: the 
motor vehicles and trailers manufacturing industry (ISIC 34) is the biggest specialisation 
gainer, was classified as a medium high tech industry for Poland and would be a medium 
high tech industry in OECD economies, and has a relevant size. The same is true for 
electrical machinery and apparatus; radio, TV and communication; and medical, precision 
and opticals, watches and clocks; although the latter might still be too small an industry in 
Poland to be counted as ‘strategic’ industry. 
The analysis of this paper might still be considered too unsophisticated to warrant such 
specific  policy advice.  Yet, the analysis does indicate that the selected branches of 
manufacturing industry would be  good  candidates for structural policy, as they  could 
increase the potentials of their economies to improve the prospects for a closure of the 
productivity gap. Future research could disaggregate further and assess alternative criteria 
for the selection of strategic industries. This, however, remains beyond the scope of this 
paper. Also of interest for future research could be the attempt of an actual quantification 
of  ‘potentials  for future productivity increases’ by using west European  economies as 
benchmark. ________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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Conclusions 
Various historical events of premature integration call on the economic profession to 
engage into further research into both positive and negative effects of integration. Too little 
effort had so far been invested into determining under what conditions integration can be 
hazardous to the weaker partner, despite the undisputed gains in terms of intensified trade 
(division of labour) and efficiency in the allocation of resources. 
The review of contemporary integration theory suggested to focus in that respect on 
productivity, or the closure of the productivity-gap, as a condition for the favourability of 
further integration and intensified competition. Endogenous productivity increases can be 
promoted by way of structural change, favourably one which involves a specialisation of 
domestic economic activity on higher technology branches involving high R&D intensities. 
The paper applies the OECD-method of branch-classification according to the criterion of 
R&D intensities to assess past developments and the current state of affairs. The analysis 
not only shows that the size of the productivity-gap is sufficiently large to assume significant 
‘advantages of backwardness’ in potential ‘qualitative’ economic growth. The analysis also 
comes to the conclusion that with respect to the prospected EU-membership, integration 
might well be premature as yet for Poland and the Czech Republic. Some structural policy 
in both economies could improve the conditions for catch-up development via integration. 
Solely the Hungarian case exhibits simultaneously a promising as well as intensifying extent 
of specialisation in branches involving higher technologies and can thus be expected to 
benefit from further intensification of competition by way of integration. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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Table:  Average 
1) Empirical R&D Intensities 
2) and technological classification 
3) for Manufacturing Industries in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland 
Manufacturing industry  ISIC  Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland  
    R&D Intensities  classification  R&D Intensities  classification  R&D Intensities  classification 
Food products and beverages  15      0.038  low  0.024  low 
Tobacco products  16      0.025  low     
  15+16  0.038  low         
Textiles  17      0.045  low     
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur  18      0.005  low     
  17+18  0.295  medium low         
Tanning of leather, luggage, handbags, harness, footwear  19  0.259  medium low  0.042  low     
  17:19          0,195  medium low 
Wood and cork  20  0.016  low  0.000  low     
Paper and paper products  21      0.036  low     
Publishing and printing  22      0.000  low     
  21+22  0.064  low      0,038  low 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels  23  0.181  medium low  0.346  medium high  0.132  medium low 
Chemicals and chemical products  24  0.972  medium high  1.953  high  0.812  medium high 
Rubber and plastic products  25  1.068  high  0.323  medium high  0.378  medium high 
Other non-metallic mineral products  26  0.240  medium low  0.115  medium low  0.119  medium low 
Basic metals  27      0.192  medium low  0.221  medium low 
Fabricated metal products  28      0.078  low  0.089  low 
  27+28  0.411  medium high         
Machinery, n.e.c.  29  1.162  high  0.251  medium low  1.012  high 
Office, accounting and computing machinery  30      0.159  medium low  0.117  medium low 
Electrical machinery and apparatus  31      0.319  medium high  1.008  high 
Radio, TV, communication equipment  32      1.095  high  1.371  high 
Medical, precision and opticals, watches and clocks  33      1.189  high  0.497  medium high 
  30:33  0.899  medium high         
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  34      0.304  medium high  0.497  medium high 
Other transport equipment  35      0.038  low  1.666  high 
  34+35  2.704  high         
Furniture, other manufacturing, n.e.c.  36  0.386  medium high  0.035  low  0.017  low 
Notes:  1)  Averages: 1992-1998 for the Czech Republic, 1993-1996 for Hungary and 1994-1996 for Poland. Only for these years, comparable R&D data was available. 
  2)  R&D Intensities have been calculated as sector-specific R&D expenditure as a percentage of total domestic sales. 
  3)  Classification margins: High technology for > 1.000 and 1.000 ‡ medium high ‡ 0.300 and 0.300 > medium low ‡ 0.100 and low technology for < 0.100. 
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